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I. INTRODUCTION
conomists have attempted aggressively to influence American legal
developments.' Yet, the models with which economists organize their
analysis have peculiar qualities that make them especially productive for
some purposes, but misleading for others.' Although economic thinking is
highly precise and systematic, the reality which economic models claim to
dissect frequently does not conform to the neatness and logical qualities
that characterize these models.3 Those in the legal community who base
their decisions upon the advice of economic experts need to be sensitive
to the deductive nature of economic thinking. As an intellectual device
shaping legislation and judicial decisions, economic models are only as
appropriate as the factual base upon which they are built." Since econom-
ics has such a limited empirical base, careful evaluation of economic mod-
els necessitates an alertness to the contrived factual foundation upon
which specific models are built. There must also be an awareness on the
part of those listening that these economic arguments, while purportedly
** Assistant Professor of Legal Studies, Bowling Green State University; B.A. Ed., Bow-
ling Green State University; J.D., University of Toledo.
R. SOLO, THE PoSITIvE STATE 39-49 (1982)(particularly important have been the con-
tributions of economists to our thinking about the interaction between business and the
consumer).
' See Leontief, The Distribution of Work and Income, Sci. AM., Sept. 1982, at 188 and
Smith, The Big Picture, EsQuIRE, Feb. 1981, at 10, 11 (interview with Wassily Leontlief for
a perceptive critique of the lack of data that characterizes typical economic models.
3 G. MYRDAL. AGAINST THE STREAM 133-57 (1973).
' Theoretical abstractions have a tendency to become concrete in the minds of those
who deploy them. A model of reality is not reality itself but an image replete with emphasis
and distortions.
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value-free, really possess numerous normative overtones.
This Comment focuses on the frequent conflict between orthodox eco-
nomic theory and the direction taken by legislation or the common law.
Several specific areas of legal decision making are discussed as illustra-
tions of this conflict with an emphasis on the artificiality of the economic
thinking that caused the disagreement. The purpose of this analysis is to
caution those who would use economic models as their primary beacon for
prescribing future legal developments.' The first section of this Comment
looks at three specific controversial areas in which orthodox economic ar-
guments are frequently considered: wage and price controls, comparable
worth claims, and minimum wage laws. For each of these debates, the
analysis demonstrates the conflict between prevailing economic theory
and the eventual legal development and points out the flawed factual ba-
sis upon which much of the economic theory rests. The second section
then suggests commonalities that characterize the debate and speculates
about the reason for the tension between economic models and legal deci-
sion making.
II. WAGE AND PRICE CONTROLS
Wage and price controls or guidelines are part of a legislative effort to
change the amount of inflation that occurs if workers, businesses, and
consumers are allowed to establish wages and prices through market deci-
sions. A definite preference for market decisions characterizes our econ-
omy;6 hence, wage and price controls have been enacted only during eco-
nomic emergencies such as wars or hyperinflation. For it is only during
such unusual circumstances that supporters of controls can generate
enough enthusiasm to attain their objective.
Despite their general reluctance to alter market wages and prices,
Americans have experimented with controls or guidelines on several occa-
sions and doubtlessly will continue those experiments in the future. Con-
trols were enacted by Congress during World War II to weaken the infla-
tionary impact from the bursts of consumer spending.7 Again during the
early 1960's, President Kennedy instituted a program of voluntary wage
and price guidelines." While the inflationary impact of the Vietnam War
and the resistance of business and labor to the guidelines eventually led
See, e.g., Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972)(use of a fault
system of liability to subsidize emerging industries was no longer necessary in an advanced
industrial age).
6 See E HUNT, PROPERTY AND PROPHETS 165-80 (4th ed. 1981)(analyzing the variations
of contemporary "contemporary American capitalism").
I See AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INST. FOR PUB. POLICY RESEARCH, WAGE-PRICE CONTROLS IN
WORLD WAR II, UNITED STATES AND GERMANY 7-52 (S. Campbell ed. 1971)(analyzing specific
United States' efforts to control prices and wages during the 1940's); J. POHLMAN, INFLATION
UNDER CONTROL? 178 (1976)(discussing more recent governmental price and wage controls).




to their official demise, the guidelines were in effect for six years.9 More
recently, the Nixon administration froze prices and wages in September
1971; this control program continued until 1974.10 This cursory review ex-
emplifies the occasional willingness of the executiv4 or legislative branch
to impose political decisions on the price and wage determination process.
While the legislative popularity of controls and guidelines has fluctu-
ated, mainstream economists have consistently opposed governmental al-
teration of wages and prices. Economists tend to prefer solutions to infla-
tion that would preserve the purity of "the market process." The case
against controls presented by economists provides that through competi-
tion the market exerts the necessary control over business behavior." If
markets are highly competitive, "the individual firm has little or no
choice over the price it will charge for its products.' ' 2 In effect, the firm
is at the mercy of consumers and technology and is basically powerless; it
must obey consumer dictates or fail. If prices rise, the increase is an indi-
cator that consumers have decided that more societal resources should be
channeled to that particular product or service.' 3 In this scenario, price
and wage increases serve a vital function by directing scarce resources to
their optimal uses.'
The attack on controls by mainstream economists can be characterized
as a defense of profits as a necessary indicator of consumer desires.' 5 If
prices are controlled by the political process, profits will be directed by
nonmarket criteria. The result, economists argue, would be a serious mis-
allocation of resources as the inefficient or obsolete business would be
protected by well-meaning, but myopic, government regulators.'
I See W. HELLER, NEW DIMENSIONS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (1966); A. OKUN, THE POLITI-
CAL ECONOMY OF PROSPERITY (1970); Anderson, Wages and the Guideposts: Comment, 59
AM- EcON. REV. 351 (1969); Christian, Bargaining Functions and the Effectiveness of the
Wage-Price Guideposts, 37 S. EcoN. J. 51 (1970); Perry, Wages and the Guideposts, 57 AM.
ECON. REV. 897 (1967); Throop, The Union-Nonunion Wage Differential and Cost-Push
Inflation, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 79 (1968) for analysis of the rationale and evaluations of the
Kennedy-Johnson guidelines.
'o See Gordon, Response of Wages and Prices to the First Two Years of Controls, 1973
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON EcON. ACTIVITY 765 (assessing the effectiveness of the Nixon con-
trols); Mitchell, The Impact and Administration of Wage Controls, in WAGE-PRICE CON-
TROLS 36 (J. Kraft & B. Roberts eds. 1975)(same).
" See Houthakker, Are Controls the Answer?, 54 REv. ECON. & STATISTICS 231 (1972).
Houthakker takes the position that political decision making lacks the allocative wisdom of
market decisions. If governmental solutions to inflation are demanded by political reality,
he contends that the government should concentrate on restoration of competition to the
marketplace so that market decision making could again function according to the competi-
tive model. Id. at 233-34.
" R, MCKENZIE & G. TULLOCK, MODERN POLITICAL ECONOMY 195 (1978).
Id. at 196.
'° Id. at 195.
See, e.g., Grayson, Controls Are Not the Answer, CHALLENGE, Nov.-Dec. 1974, at 9.
See, e.g., id. at 10-11.
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The controversy surrounding rent controls is a narrow but representa-
tive example of the dispute between orthodox economic reasoning and
legislative change. Economists attacking rent controls, or those using or-
thodox economic rationales, assert that the need for such controls is im-
aginary.' The shortage of housing necessitates rent increases and large
profits which allegedly assure an adequate number of housing units.'
Such reasoning is correct to the extent that the model on which it is
based is factually correct. If owners of housing units are unable to manip-
ulate their prices and if the bargaining power of the parties is equal, as
the competitive model assumes, then (but only then) can we regard rent
controls as futile and misguided. 9
Some courts have recognized at least tacitly the lack of a solid factual
basis for the application of this competitive model to the housing situa-
tion. At least during times of war, courts have been reluctant to strike
down rent controls."0 They have recognized that during wartime, capital,
labor, and materials are diverted from the construction of housing to mili-
tary production, and thus, spiraling rental rates will result only in spiral-
ing profits for landlords 2 As a failing economy induces more urban com-
munities to enact rent control legislation, it seems unlikely that the
courts will follow orthodox economic wisdom and strike down these
controls.
III. COMPARABLE WORTH CLAIMS
According to mainstream economists, markets provide a mechanism
whereby each worker is rewarded financially on the basis of his or her
contribution to the market value of the good or service which is sold by
the employer. Hence, markets distribute incomes fairly, a high wage to
productive workers and a low wage to nonproductive workers.22 High
wages also serve as a social incentive to attract a greater number of work-
ers to high paying occupations; low wages provide a corresponding disin-
centive for those who might consider entering such low paying occupa-
tions.2 3 This incentive pattern accomplishes a useful social task since it
provides information to workers about the needs of consumers:2 ' If a
17 See, e.g., Owens, Rent Controls: Solution or Problem, 41 SASK. L. REv. 3 (1976).
See id. at 6-12.
'9 For discussions that question the assumptions of the competitive model, see Baat,
Rent Control in the 1970's: The Case of the New Jersey Tenants' Movement, 28 HASTINGS
L.J. 630 (1977) and Robson & Watchman, Short Hold: Repealing the Rent Act? 124 SOLIC. J.
367 (1980).
o See Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 142 n.6 (1948).
" See id. at 146.
12 C. LINDSAY, EQUAL PAY FOR COMPARABLE WORK: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF A NEW AN-
TIDISCRIMINATION DOCTRINE 4-16 (1980).
13 Id. at 7.




worker enters a high wage industry, he is responding to consumer
signals.25
Apparently, the model that leads economists to these conclusions is the
same competitive model that explains their antagonism toward wage and
price controls. Wages, the price of labor, move up or down in this model
according to consumers' whims. As a result, neither employers nor em-
ployees possess bargaining power; each is at the mercy of consumers.
Thus the model being used by economists to defend existing wage differ-
entials is one in which bargaining power among employers and employees
is nonexistent.26 There are no centers of economic power, only atomistic
workers and employers mercilessly directed by consumer choice, and the
wage is the auction price agreed to by coequal workers and employers.
2 7
The courts have been somewhat more receptive than many economists
to the pleas of certain workers that their market wage was determined in
a less pure fashion than that projected by economic orthodoxy. For in-
stance, in recent comparable worth claims before the courts, judges have
made wage comparisons between males and females performing dissimilar
work. Women in particular occupations have claimed that an equal-pay-
for-comparable-work system would result in a male-female wage differen-
tial that is much less than the fifty-two percent differential identified in
the 1980 census.2 8 While the United States Supreme Court refused in
County of Washington v. Gunther29 to approve explicitly comparable
worth actions it did make a comparison of wages for dissimilar work.30
Consequently, those who dislike market wage differentials have been en-
thusiastic about the possibility that the courts soon will regularly recog-
nize comparable worth as a legal doctrine by which wages in dissimilar
occupations can be challenged."'
The willingness of courts on any legal basis to alter market wages and
to honor a discrimination claim is an affront to the market model being
used by orthodox economists. That model provides that discrimination of
any kind could not long survive since some profit-hungry employer would
recognize the discrimination and quickly offer an appropriate wage that
(1982).
" L. VON MISES, HUMAN ACTION 270-72 (1949).
" See, e.g., Galbraith, Power and the Useful Economist, 63 AM. EcON. REV. 1, 6 (1973).
" Hildebrand, The Market System, in COMPARABLE WORTH: ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES 85
(R. Livernash ed. 1980).
"a See C. LINDSAY, supra note 22, at 31.
" 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
"0 Id. at 166-68.
" Particularly promising for comparable worth advocates had been the federal district
court decision in Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., 573 F. Supp. 148 (E.D. Cal. 1981), rev'd, 691
F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1982). This case, if it had been upheld by the Ninth Circuit, would di-
rectly challenge the market defense which employers habitually rely in sex discrimination
claims under Title VII. However, the circuit court of appeals reversed the district court on
that issue. 691 F.2d at 875-77.
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would resolve the short-run discrimination. In such a system of thought,
any discrimination claim is suspect in the sense that, in all probability,
the claim is just an attempt by an unproductive worker to attain what the
market justifiably refused to grant.
IV. MINIMUM WAGE LAWS
The Fair Labor Standards Act of 193832 created a minimum wage for
workers in most nonagricultural industries. Since the enactment of this
law, the minimum has been raised regularly.33 Economists have responsed
regularly to proposals for new increases with the claim that minimum
wages increase unemployment. One popular text points out that econo-
mists "universally agree" that such an effect occurs.-
4
The basis for such unusual accord among economists is relatively
straightforward. The model that shapes their conviction begins by sup-
posing that productivity is measurable and that the employer can base
wages on productivity differences. 3 The model also assumes that all firms
in the economy are in the type of situation where none of them has any
ability to alter demand or restrict supply.3 6 Finally, it assumes that each
worker is maximizing his productivity.3 7 The model sketched by these as-
sumptions explains economists' low regard for minimum wages.
The conclusion drawn from the model is that any wage payment that
exceeds the current market wage will require the employer to lay off
those workers whose lack of productivity does not justify an increased
wage. No employer is able to absorb the increased wage into its cost
structure since each firm in the assumed market is able to earn only a
minimal profit, that is one that just covers costs."8 The employer has no
choice but to lay off workers who would have been employed had the
legislation not intervened."6
However, a change in one assumption in this typical productivity model
can bring out dramatic changes in the resulting policy proposals. Assume,
for instance, that businesses respond to minimum wage increases by dis-
Ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982)).
' See R. MCKENZIE & G. TULLOCK, supra note 12, at 255-56.
a R. FREEMAN, LABOR ECONOMICS 165 (1979).
31 R. MCKENZIE & G. TULLOCK, supra note 12, at 254. See Magdoff, The Economists'
New Clothes, 234 NATION 359-61 (1982) for a recent criticism of the purported precision of
productivity statistics.
36 R. MCKENZIE & G. TULLCK, supra note 12, at 254.
11 Id. at 256.
38 See R. HEILBRONER & L. THUROW, THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM 369-402 (6th ed. 1981).
31 See S LEVITAN & R. BELOUS, MORE THAN SUBSISTENCE: MINIMUM WAGES FOR THE
WORKING POOR (1979) for an excellent presentation of the typical defenses and criticisms of
minimum wage legislation. Levitan and Belous are particularly effective at pointing out the
empirical artificiality of the models used by economists to explain the alleged effects of




covering and encouraging productivity improvements. Existing produc-
tion facilities might be reorganized so that the higher wage payments re-
sulting from a minimum wage increase would have no negative
employment effect. Instead, the minimum wage hike would have provided
a stimulus for productivity advances that would have otherwise remained
unrealized. 0 Yet, to arrive at this conclusion, it first was necessary to
revise the typical assumption that employee productivity is currently
maximized.
V. SUMMARY
Several similarities in the economic reasoning that opposes wage-price
controls, comparable worth claims, and minimum wage laws can be iden-
tified. First, there is the presumption that economic consideration should
prevail over criteria drawing their strength from rights or moral princi-
ples.' However, this presumption results in the derogation of nonmarket
decision making in legislatures and courts which are prone to consider
competing values that are much broader than the drive for material
acquisition.
A second commonality is the lack of factual content in the economic
reasoning process that results in the attacks on wage-price controls, com-
parable worth claims, and minimum wage laws. The competitive markets
that are taken as a precondition to model formulation are not necessarily
descriptive of our world just because such a world would result in more
precise economic analysis. It is questionable whether business is typically
competitive. The share of total output of the 100 largest businesses in the
manufacturing sector is approximately fifty percent of the total manufac-
turing output."2 Such a statistic is inconsistent with the assumption of
powerless businesses in competitive industries. It is more typical for large
businesses to plan, manage, and manipulate their prices,43 than it is for
them to be the passive recipients of consumer signals.
A third and more general similarity is that the methodology of all three
economic perspectives is deductive. If one accepts the assumptions as fac-
tually accurate, then the conclusions are correct. Therefore, the diver-
gence between legislators or jurists and economists is often created by the
unwillingness of the former to accept a set of suppositions that is ex-
" Lester, Marginalism, Minimum Wages, and Labor Markets, 37 AM. ECON. REV. 135,
142-45 (1947).
" See Baker, The Ideology of the Economic Analysis of Law, 5 PHIL & PUBL. AFF. 3, 4,
35 (1975)("welfare economics as currently used by legal writers provides an ideological, and
frequently objectionable, basis for policy guidance"); Kelman, Choice and Utility, 1979 Wis.
L. REV. 769, 796 (the assumption that "free choice" in the marketplace will lead to the well-
being of society is hard to justify).
U1 .S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 1982-83, at 543 (103d ed. 1982).
'3 J. GALBRAITH, ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC PURPOSE 110-21 (1973).
1984-85]
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tremely artificial. Economic reasoning is typically a set of hypothetical
statements followed by the logical result that flows from those assump-
tions. Only a careful examination of economists' assumptions permits an
accurate assessment of the worth of their advice.
Why are legislators and judges resistant at times to this deductive
methodology? Perhaps the answer lies in the concreteness of the
problems that initiate legal action: inflation is annoyingly high, legislators
are pressured, and wage-price controls become more attractive. Women
perceive inequities in the pay differential between nurses and tree sur-
geons; they seek resolution of their concern in the courts. The issues that
come before the courts and legislatures focus on a set of existing condi-
tions. Therefore, responses must be directed to specific individuals and
entities.
Economists function on an abstract plane; they frequently discuss the
worker, the wage, or the business. While economists strive to remove
themselves from the idiosyncrasies of particular fact patterns, they run
the risk of their work becoming irrelevant to the legislative and judicial
processes. The extent to which economists can enrich legal developments
depends in large part on their willingness to enlarge the factual founda-
tions of their claims.
[Vol. 33:505
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol33/iss3/17
